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SECOM-M-265

23 March 1983

Minutes
Two Hundred and Sixty-first Meeting
Wednesday, 23 March 1983, 1000 - 1200 Hours
Room 4E64, Langley Headquarters Building

[REDACTED]
Chairman
Presiding

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MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Robert C. Allen, Department of the Navy
Mr. Maynard Anderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense
[REDACTED], Jr., USA, Defense Intelligence Agency
Mr. John McNamara, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
Mr. George J. Mercuro, Department of the Air Force
Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice

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ALTERNATES PRESENT

Mr. Frank Dill, Department of the Army
Mr. Dan Downum, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Capt. William C. Horn, USA, Department of the Navy
Mr. Louis C. Kachulis, Department of State
Mr. Roger T. Smith, Department of the Air Force

ALSO PRESENT

[REDACTED], Central Intelligence Agency*
Mr. Marvin Doig, Department of State
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency
[REDACTED], Central Intelligence Agency [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], National Security Agency
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Defense Intelligence Agency
Mr. Donald Stigers, Department of State
[REDACTED] Executive Secretary
[REDACTED] SECOM Staff

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*Present for part of meeting

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Preliminary Comments

The Chairman:

1. Advised that copies of NSDD-84 were at members' places. He noted that it requires signature of a nondisclosure agreement (NdA) containing a pre-publication review clause as a condition of access to SCI. [] said a poll of members on current NdA practices showed that all Community components except NSA were using Form 4193 or the same text under an internal form number (e.g., DoD's Form 1847-1). He advised that the NSDD tasks the information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) to develop standardized NdAs to satisfy the NSDD's requirements. ISOO held a meeting on that subject during the week of 14-18 March. [] said he gave the CIA representative to that meeting a copy of Form 4193 and asked him to present it as the form now in general use in the Community. In response to NSDD tasking, ISOO plans to draft an NdA for access to noncompartmented information and circulate it for comment. [] advised that with DCI approval he had called Mr. Garfinkel to request SECOM representation on his NdA working group. Mr. Garfinkel said he thought it would be more appropriate for SECOM to be presented on a senior-level group to be formed. [] accepted the offer. []

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[] said Mr. deGraffenreid of the NSC staff convened a meeting on 18 March at which he assumed responsibility for guiding NSDD-84 implementation. Mr. deGraffenreid is working on a response to the requirement in section 1.d of the NSDD for policies to govern contacts between agency personnel and media representatives. The NSDD also requires Justice to review disclosures reported to it to determine if FBI investigation is warranted; and to consult interested departments and agencies to develop criteria for evaluating cases for priority of investigation. [] said he had renewed the offer of the services of the Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee (UDIS) which members had endorsed at the October 1982 SECOM seminar. A draft DCI memo to the Attorney General to formalize this offer is in routing to Mr. Casey. []

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[] advised that Tom Stewart, Department of Justice Public Affairs Office, had called him on 21 March to ask how many people would have to sign NdAs for access to SCI. []

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do so. [] told Mr. Stewart it would be inappropriate to answer press inquiries on this subject by stating how many persons have access to SCI. He told Mr. Stewart that there was nothing new in the NSDD concerning NdAs for SCI access, and that no one should have to sign anything they weren't supposed to have signed already in connection with SCI access. Mr. Rubino said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard Willard was aware of this subject. []

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2. Reported that:

a. He had provided the IG/CM Secretariat a 50-page response to their tasking on the IG/CM organizational study. [] said a copy of the SECOM input would be sent to members.


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b. UDIS continues to work on a proposal for a damage assessment data base in response to IG/CM tasking. In response to specific tasking from [] IG/CM Executive Secretary, the proposal is to include a draft NSDD which would mandate participation by all departments and agencies in the data base system. []

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[] Mr. Anderson said OSD had briefed Congressional committees in depth on the care with which polygraph operators were trained and supervised, and the controls applied to examinations to guard against abuses. He said the briefings had no apparent effect in blunting criticism. [] noted that abuse and misuse of the technique in the private sector had given the polygraph a bad reputation. [] asked if one of the members would prepare a proposal for a study of the polygraph. [] said NSA would do so. [] asked that Mr. Anderson's comments be considered in framing the proposal. []

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4. Said [] had been detailed to the SECOM staff for eight months to assist on computer security matters. [] recently worked with the Planning and Policy Staff, IC Staff, on computer security. [] will have the function of trying to identify and document the problems with computer security policy and of attempting to formulate proposals for solutions, in support of the ongoing work of [] on the staff, and of [] as chairman of the subcommittee. [] advised that he and [] had attended a 22 March meeting of the HUMINT Committee to discuss a collection requirement on computer security. []

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5. Invited members' attention to copies at their places of:

a. A memo from him to the IG/CM Chairman agreeing to involvement of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee and its Audio Countermeasures Working Group in efforts to formulate a TEMPEST program.

b. A memo from him in the mail to members concerning review of requests for exemption from DCID 1/7 controls.

c. The new collection requirement on hostile threats to U. S. computer security. []

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[] left for an urgent meeting at this point, and turned the chair over to [] until his return.

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6. [] noted that this was [] last SECOM meeting, as he is scheduled to leave DIA the end of March for Ft. Meade, where he will be Commanding Officer of the Army's Central Clearance Facility. [] expressed the sincere thanks of the Committee and staff for [] solid support of SECOM work, and wished [] well on his new assignment. [] would represent DIA until June, when Col. [] U. S. Army, would report as their new Director of Security.

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ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes

In the absence of requests for change, the minutes of the 26 January and 23 February 1983 meetings were approved as written. []

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ITEM 2 Subcommittee Reports

A. Computer Security - [], reported that the subcommittee's drafting group has been asked to redo the earlier draft revision of DCID 1/16 to make the changes requested by SECOM members at their 23 February meeting. The subcommittee will review the drafting group's efforts. []

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B. Personnel Security - [] reported on the 2-day seminar subcommittee members [] briefed them

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on DoD personnel security initiatives. They discussed the status of OPM's proposed five-level position sensitivity designation system, possible revision of E. O. 10450, and the activity of the IG/CM working group on personnel security. They addressed initial subcommittee budget proposals for FY 1985, and restructured them to eliminate study [redacted] (being covered by a current DoD study). They tabulated survey questionnaires on the series of adjudicators seminars, and noted that supervisors commented that their adjudicators did their jobs with greater insight after attending the seminars. They reviewed and agreed to minor changes in the curriculum of the adjudicators seminar, and they discussed the SCI personnel security program in the context of inputs to the IG/CM organizational study. [redacted]

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[redacted] advised that the 8th adjudicators' seminar was the largest to date, with 25 able and inquisitive attendees. Seminar attendees questioned whether investigative data pertinent to SCI adjudication determinations are being shared properly between Community agencies. (Chairman, SECOM, memo for members dated 14 March asks for a review of agency practices and a report by 1 April 1983). [redacted] expressed his appreciation to those who helped arrange and put on the seminar. He advised that the ninth seminar, limited to 24 attendees, is scheduled for 23-27 May 1983. He stated that nominations in writing were due to the SECOM staff no later than 2 May. [redacted]

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[redacted] advised that the package on DCID 1/14 revision was in preparation. He said the draft revision does not mention the requirement that the nondisclosure agreement to be signed as a condition of access contain a prepublication review clause. He asked members if they would agree to revising the draft to include that requirement, consistent with the provisions of the Security Policy Manual for SCI Control Systems and NSDD-84. All agreed to this. [redacted] advised that the OSD minority position on 10 versus 15-year scope would go to the DCI with a request for guidance on resolution of the difference. [redacted]

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C. Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations - [redacted] distributed strawman responses to tasking from the IG/CM for a paper on sharing damage assessment data among agencies. He advised that UDIS members expressed concerns about security, need-to-know and cost aspects of this matter at their 22 March meeting. He noted that the IG/CM is looking for a data base which would capture information on all types of compromises, not just intelligence or leaks. [redacted] wondered if there could be three bases - a DCI-managed one for intelligence data; a DoD-managed one for nonintelligence military and defense-related data; and a State Department-managed one for diplomatic and other data. He suggested these options in response to the IG/CM: (1) recommending against a data base; (2) offering the three options of a full, divided (e.g., DCI, DoD and State managed), and partial data base; and (3) a limited, bookkeeping-type data base. He said UDIS members had voted at their 22 March meeting in favor of the three options proposal. Mr. Anderson emphasized that the issue of a data base was an inappropriate subject for a Presidential directive, as had been requested by the IG/CM staff. He said he did not consider that a data base would be helpful, but stated that options needed to be presented to and dealt with by the IG/CM. Col. Mercurio said he

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didn't support establishment of a data base, and stated he thought it would be an unmanageable exercise. Mr. Rubino spoke against seeking a Presidential directive on the subject, and stated it was not necessary to include details in a data base. He suggested that damage in particular cases just be stated to be high, medium or low, with the data base serving as an index to details available in individual agencies. A suggestion was made to propose a limited-scope, limited-duration pilot project to try to determine what could and could not be reasonably obtained from a data base. [] asked for guidance on framing terms of reference for a pilot project. Mr. Anderson suggested sending the IG/CM the three options of no data base, a modified one, and a full one, plus a recommendation for a limited time-frame pilot project to be done by SECOM using resources obtained by the IG/CM. The pilot project object would be to obtain experience to guide future initiatives in this area.

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[] expressed concern about the scope of the project. [] said we had the option of recommending that all compromises of classified information or only those considered serious by Community agencies be included.

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[] said the FBI would prefer to limit it to serious cases. He questioned the need for a data base system if the Community is only reporting 4 or 5 cases a month to Justice. Mr. Rubino spoke in favor of a project in order to size the problem in objective terms. [] said that if members only want a log of compromises, that could probably be maintained manually. But, if we want a capability to do in-depth analysis, we will need a computerized system. Mr. Rubino suggested we start by using the minimum data each agency is willing to contribute; assess the results; and build on that.

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[] summed up the discussion by putting the question to members of whether they wanted to respond to the IG/CM by offering the three options of no, modified and full data bases; stating that SECOM was opposed to a data base containing sensitive, detailed information; and stating that SECOM wanted a pilot study done in general terms, limited to intelligence disclosures. All members indicated their agreement with this.

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ITEM 3 DCID 1/20 Revision

[] invited members' attention to the material sent out with the agenda concerning the CIA member's nonconcurrence on the draft revision of DCID 1/20. He asked for comments on the change proposed by CIA. Mr. Kachulis said State was concerned that the CIA change would lead to abuses, and could provide an excuse for personnel to avoid keeping current on security awareness matters. Mr. Dill stated that the Army was opposed to waivers in this area. He said the DCID provided enough latitude on implementation that the CIA change was not needed to ensure flexibility. Col. Mercurio and Mr. Allen stated their agreement with these comments. [] said CIA was looking for a common sense approach. [] asked him if he wished to maintain the CIA proposal given the lack of support and the number and kind of objections voiced. [] withdrew CIA's proposed change []

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ITEM 4 New Business

None. []

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ITEM 5 Security Awareness Presentation

[] a DIA-produced videotape designed to make cleared personnel aware of the consequences of deliberate leaks of classified information, was shown. [] said the tape's classification had limited the circumstances under which it could be shown. He advised that it had evoked a good response from those who had seen it. In response to [] question, [] said it had been shown to senior officials (e.g., in the JCS organization). Their response was favorable, but they criticized the tape's ending as being weak. Several members expressed interest in using the tape and [] asked that requests for it be sent to his office. [] asked members if this presentation suggested the need for SECOM to pursue any new initiatives in security awareness. Members had no suggestions to offer. []

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[] advised that the last of the current series of program presentations to SECOM members was scheduled for 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, 30 March 1983, in room 7D32, Langley Headquarters Building. The presentations will be by the R&D Subcommittee and the Security Advisory Group USSR, and will provide opportunity for members to discuss the work of those bodies. []

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[] offered members the option of 20 or 27 April for the next SECOM business meeting. He said Miss Eloise Page, Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff, had been invited to attend. Members expressed their preference for holding the meeting on Wednesday, 20 April 1983, at 10:00 a.m. []

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